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Skokie, Illinois, 1978. A retired black and white police car is stuck in 
traffic before a bridge where a political rally is being held by Nazis of the 
American Socialist White People’s Party. In the car, two men, wearing 
black suits, black hats, and black sunglasses, stand idle. The Nazis’ 
venomous leader delivers a racist and violence-mongering speech, which 
infuriates the onlookers. The Nazis are protected from the angry crowd of 
hecklers by a line of police. One of the men in black calmly states: “I hate 
Illinois Nazis,” as the other slams the gas pedal, charges the ranks of the 
brownshirts and stampedes them off the bridge into the water, to the cheers 
of the crowd. As they drive off, the soaked Nazi commander vows revenge.1 
This scene from the 1980 blockbuster comedy The Blues Brothers2 is a 
popular cultural expression of a uniquely-American legal provision: the 
constitutional protection of hate speech by virtue of the free speech clause 
of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The legal regime 
for hate speech in the United States has no equivalent anywhere in the world 
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and is baffling to non-Americans. Europeans, in particular, whose countries 
served as the locus of Nazism’s horrors, tend to hold the U.S. constitutional 
protection of hate speech in disbelief, before shaking their heads in 
contempt and concluding something along the lines of “those crazy 
Americans.” This protection of hate speech, however, makes a lot of sense 
in the American context. In this paper, I argue that the aforementioned 
scene from The Blues Brothers has great potential to elucidate the meaning 
of the constitutional protection of hate speech, and, more broadly, of the 
First Amendment, for a non-American audience. I propose that the scene be 
used by comparative jurists teaching the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. I focus the comparison between the United States and 
France, for “France and the United States start from such different 
assumptions regarding freedom of speech and the relationship between 
speech and other rights that it is virtually impossible to reconcile their 
competing approaches,”3 a situation that creates deep cultural 
misunderstandings, which in turn can be reconciled using this case study. 
France is also relevant because it is one of the countries that has taken the 
most aggressive stance against American companies in the context of Nazi 
speech distributed globally over the Internet, which has resulted, in 
particular, in Yahoo!, Inc. and its executives being criminally prosecuted in 
France for violation of anti-hate speech laws.4 Fostering mutual 
understanding between the U.S. and France is therefore particularly 
important in this age of global digital information distribution. 
In Part I, I first theoretically ground the argument that consumption of 
cultural artifacts is a prerequisite to understanding the law of a country, and 
beyond it, the country’s people and society themselves (I). Part II involves a 
detailed case study of the aforementioned scene from The Blues Brothers as 
such an artifact, in order to lift the veil on the cultural signified hidden 
beyond the legal signifier that is the First Amendment, and foster mutual 
understanding between the people of the United States and other peoples 
(II). I conclude that the Blues Brothers’ Nazi scene should be used by 
comparative jurists teaching the meaning of the First Amendment to foreign 
audiences, as an aid to shine a light on the cultural, social, and political 
principles that ground the constitutional protection of hate speech in the 
United States.  
I. CONSUMING CULTURE IN COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES 
Muhammed was a merchant in Mecca, a trading city in what is now 
Saudi Arabia. During his thirties, he became interested in virtuous living 
  
 3. Russell L. Weaver, Nicolas Delpierre & Laurence Boissier, Holocaust Denial 
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 4. See case infra note 59. 
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and meditated extensively. Around the age of forty, following visions 
during these meditations, he became a prophet and called first his wife and 
friends and later a broader community to monotheism.5 
So starts the chapter on Egyptian law in a casebook entitled Law in 
Radically Different Cultures. This opening reveals the role that the 
understanding of culture plays in the comprehension of foreign laws. The 
law is an expression of culture, and one cannot understand the law if one 
does not grasp the underlying culture. The field of comparative law is 
entangled with the field of cultural studies because culture is a cornerstone 
of legal systems. The consumption of foreign culture, therefore, is a 
condition precedent to understanding foreign law, a remark echoed by Yale 
law professor James Whitman.6 Yet, as Professor Pierre Legrand, a law 
professor at the University of Paris I Sorbonne remarks, most pieces 
published as so-called “comparative legal studies” are simple descriptions 
of a foreign legal system, or a foreign law.7 Mere descriptions cannot bring 
insight. As Roland Barthes,8 building on Ferdinand de Saussure’s work,9 
pointed out quite clearly, what matters is the signified, not the signifier, and 
the description of a signifier, without any deeper analysis, is fruitless. The 
description of a foreign law not supported by a comparative cultural 
analysis not only lacks insight, but also leads to errors. Citing American 
legal scholar John Dawson’s analysis of a 1951 German legal case,10 and 
pointing out the numerous errors of interpretation by Dawson that stemmed 
from the fact that his analysis of German law was performed using 
American legal and cultural concepts, Professor Vivian Grosswald Curran 
writes: “That even a scholar of such skill and erudition should ‘misread’ is . 
. . illustrative of the degree to which underlying cultural phenomena, often 
considered extrinsic to law, influence legal analysis and the conception of 
law.”11 And Pierre Legrand to conclude that the incompetence of 
comparative law can most aptly be explained by the incompetence of 
comparative lawyers.12 Thankfully, superb work on comparative theory has 
  
 5. JOHN H. BARTON, JAMES GIBBS, VICTOR LI & JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, LAW IN 
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Societies, 109 YALE L.J. 1279 (2000). 
 7. M. Pierre Legrand, Comparer, 48 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 
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B.U. L. REV. 1039 (1983). 
 11. Vivian Grosswald Curran, Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in 
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 12. See Legrand, supra note 7. 
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also been produced, from the Italian school of Rodolfo Sacco,13 the French 
school of René David,14 the German school of Zweigert and Kötz,15 to 
numerous American scholars starting with Rudolf Schlesinger.16 Most of the 
post-World War II work focused on defining practical uses for comparative 
law, from functionalism17 to global legal harmonization as a tool of the 
search for world peace.18 The aforementioned body of work presumed, 
however, that comparative lawyers were properly trained to put comparative 
law to its proper use, which, as we have observed, is a bold presumption. 
Scholars such as Legrand and Curran, therefore, have focused on 
comparative legal methodology itself, and have defined a number of 
qualitative approaches for comparative law, which can be grouped under the 
general overarching umbrella of “immersion.”19 
Implicitly building on Roland Barthes,20 a leading semiotician, Legrand 
calls for the practice of legal hermeneutics that would require the study of 
politics, economics, and ethnography as integral to the understanding of any 
given legal system.21 History and historiography are also prime tools of 
analysis. As Yale law professor Robert Gordon points out, there even exists 
“a tradition of historiography called ‘legal functionalism.’”22 And just as 
hermeneutics and historiography make use of symbolic analysis in order to 
reach beyond the signifier, comparative law does the same. On a domestic 
level, Robin Kelley, for example, examined traditions of black folklore such 
as the “zoot suiters of Los Angeles or Detroit”23 in order to make sense of a 
“privileging of ethnic identity and masculinity, and a rejection of 
subservience”24 and to understand the construction of “an identity in which 
their gendered and racial meanings were inseparable . . . .”25 Barthes, still on 
a domestic level, analysed the content of the French guide book, The Blue 
  
 13. See Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law 
(Installment I of II), 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1991). 
 14. See RENÉ DAVID & JOHN E. C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD 
TODAY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW (3d ed. 1985). 
 15. See KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖETZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 
(Tony Weir trans., 1998). 
 16. See RUDOLPH B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., SCHLESINGER’S COMPARATIVE LAW: 
CASES, TEXT, MATERIALS (7th ed. 2009); Richard M. Buxbaum & Ugo A. Mattei, Rudolph B. 
Schlesinger 1909-1996, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1997). 
 17. See generally Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 
(1984). 
 18. See ZWEIGERT & KOETZ, supra note 15. 
 19. See Legrand, supra note 7; see also COMPARATIVE LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 
(Vivian Grosswald Curran ed., 2002). 
 20. See BARTHES, supra note 8. 
 21. See Legrand, supra note 7. 
 22. Gordon, supra note 17, at 58-59. 
 23. ROBIN D.G. KELLEY, RACE REBELS: CULTURE, POLITICS, AND THE BLACK 
WORKING CLASS 65 (1994). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 66. 
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Guide, beyond the first semiological system to decrypt how “by reducing 
geography to the description of an uninhabited world of monuments,”26 and 
by overstressing hilliness “to such an extent as to eliminate all other types of 
scenery,”27 the Guide becomes, “through an operation common to all 
mystifications,”28 the very opposite of what it advertises, an agent of 
blindness and of perpetuation of the Roman-Catholic tradition as a 
dominant frame through which French society plays out. Legrand applies 
the same methods of interpretation “to the confrontation of phenomena 
which happen on each side of the demarcation lines that separate two 
language frames of reality,”29 a reference to legal traditions as 
representations of cognitive frames. For example, Legrand opposes the 
“monumental symmetry of the perspective” that characterizes the French 
gardens, to the English gardens and bouquets of flowers which are 
organized only as the result of impulse, in order to reveal the difference 
between the common law, marked by pragmatism, to the civil law, 
dominated by systems and rules that reflect the French quest for order and 
harmony.30 
So important is culture that the analysis and understanding of the foreign 
law can only be performed appropriately using the ethnographic method and 
the immersion approach.31 And because, as German comparatist Bernhard 
Grossfeld points out, “there are no intercultural synonyms,”32 “there are no 
identical trains of thought in two languages,”33 and “several languages are 
not as many designations of one thing, they are different views of the 
same,” comparative legal analysis requires bilingualism: only by mastering 
the foreign language can one understand the cognitive framework under 
which the designer of the signifier has proceeded, which is a condition 
precedent to piercing beyond the signifier and revealing the signified. Once 
the comparatist has understood, felt, and lived the foreign signified, she 
must transmit it to the people of the world where she comes from. Only then 
can differences be explained and understood, which is a prerequisite to 
fostering mutual understanding between people of different traditions. The 
comparatist must translate the culture itself: “‘the translation of culture may 
leave the sons of the desert riding on horses instead of camels, in the village 
instead of the oasis, with church towers instead of minarets.’ Comparative 
law . . . requires an exchange of images. We must allow the concepts of the 
  
 26. See BARTHES, supra note 8. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See Legrand, supra note 7, at 279 (translation by author). 
 30. Id. at 292 (translation by author). 
 31. See Legrand, supra note 7. 
 32. BERNHARD GROSSFELD, CORE QUESTIONS OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Vivian 
Grosswald Curran, trans., 2005) (1996) (originally titled Kernfragen der 
Rechtsvergleichung). 
 33. Id. 
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foreign law to become images and then describe them in our language.”34
Here again appears the entanglement between the study of comparative law 
and the consumption of culture. Pierre Legrand suggests, for example, that 
one who would want to understand the French system of government, a 
paternalistic, top-down model35 which stresses the role of the State as a 
protector of the people,36 should spend time looking at the 1812 portrait of 
The Emperor Napoléon in His Study at the Tuileries by Jacques-Louis 
David.37 Said portrait, herein reproduced, portrays Napoléon in his office, 
drafting the Civil Code only helped by the dim light of a candle. It is a 
fiction of course, since the Code was not itself drafted by Napoléon, though 
Napoléon was the driving force behinds its principles.  
Figure 1: Jacques-Louis David, THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON IN HIS STUDY AT THE 
TUILERIES, (oil on canvas, 1812) 
 34. Id.
 35. Carlton Hayes speaks of “centrifugal forces,” something Eugene Weber remarks 
“assumes an existing ‘center.’” EUGENE WEBER, PEASANTS INTO FRENCHMEN: THE 
MODERNIZATION OF RURAL FRANCE 1870-1914 96 (1976) (quoting CARLTON J.H.
HAYES, FRANCE: A NATION OF PATRIOTS 3-5 (1930)). 
 36. For example, see article 5 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the 
Citizen, which declares that “[t]he Law has the right to forbid . . . those actions that are 
injurious to society.” DECLARATION UNIVERSELLE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME ET DU CITOYEN
art. 5 (Fr. 1789). See generally Julien Mailland, Note, Freedom of Speech, the Internet, and 
the Costs of Control: The French Example, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1179 (2001). 
 37. Jacques-Louis David, THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON IN HIS STUDY AT THE TUILERIES,
(oil on canvas, 1812).  
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For the curator of the U.S. National Gallery of Art,38  
David, in a letter to the patron of this portrait, Alexander Douglas, the 
tenth Duke of Hamilton, explained that his appearance was designed to 
show that Napoléon had spent the night in his study composing the 
Napoleonic Code, an impression enforced by details, such as the flickering 
candles that are almost extinguished, the quill pen and papers scattered on 
the desk, and the clock on the wall which points to 4:13 a.m. David 
strategically placed the sword on the chair to allude to Napoleon’s military 
success, while the prominent display of the word ‘Code’ in his papers, 
suggests his administrative achievements. Other decorative details—the 
heraldic bees and the fleurs–de–lys—are symbols of French absolutism, 
and imply Napoleon’s power as ruler.39  
“Here is a portrait,” Legrand noted, “which acts as a ‘cultural 
intermediary.’”40 And he concluded that iconography is not just “finery,” it 
is also a “great purveyor of lessons.”41 In this case, it helps to contrast the 
civil law with the common law system, and helps to understand that French 
law is not framed from the ground up, as in the common law tradition, but 
from top down, as, symbolized, in the portrait, by the Emperor drafting the 
Code.  
The foregoing methods are effective ways to inform Americans’ 
understanding of French laws which Americans meet with disbelief: the 
criminal prohibition of presenting a substance as having the effects of 
narcotics,42 the criminal prohibition to broadcast in a language other than 
French,43 criminal press offenses such as insulting the President of the 
Republic,44 or the fact that the French pre-Web digital information network, 
the Minitel, while packet switched, was subject to censorship through a 
centralized network-design controlled by the State.45 In all of the above 
cases appears the paternalistic hand of the state as materialized in Article 5 
of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. The Declaration, 
which declares that “[t]he Law has the right to forbid . . . those actions that 
are injurious to society,” and revealed to the uninformed onlooker by an 
  
 38. Nat’l Gallery of Art, The Emperor Napoleon in His Study at the Tuileries—
Notes, http://www.nga.gov/fcgi-bin/tinfo_f?object=46114&detail=note (last visited Aug. 29, 
2012). 
 39. Legrand, supra note 7, at 289. 
 40. See supra note [Legrand] at 289, translation by author. 
 41. Id. 
 42. CODE. DE LA SANTÉ PUBLIQUE art. L3421-4 (Fr.). 
 43. Loi n0 94-665 du 4 août 1994, J.O. du 5 août 1995, p. 11392. 
 44. Loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la liberté de la presse, J.O., du 30 juil. 1881, p. 4201, 
art 26. 
 45. See generally Mailland, supra note 36, at 1186-95.  
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analysis of the Emperor’s portrait by Jacques-Louis David. In the same 
manner, these methods are apt at shedding light for non-Americans on why 
certain American legal principles such as the constitutional protection of 
hate speech, while being repugnant to most Europeans for historical 
reasons,46 make sense in the American setting. There has, however, been 
very little published on that topic by way of thoughtful comparisons, and, 
along the lines of Legrand’s lamentations, one must observe that mere 
descriptions of U.S. positive law do nothing to foster mutual understanding 
between the United States and other countries.47 James Whitman, in the 
introduction to his comparative analysis of the culture of civility and respect 
in the United States, France,48 and Germany,49 made an equivalent 
observation, albeit from the standpoint of an American analyzing European 
hate-speech laws:  
France in particular, we have been told, with its pattern of courtesy and 
respect, is a more ‘mature’ or more ‘civilized’ place that the United States. 
But it has to be said that these comparative observations have been made 
in a naïve way. Authors generally summarize the cold black letter of 
foreign ‘hate speech laws’ . . . they make no effort to explain how or why 
the regulation of civility appears in some societies and not in others. It is 
all well and good to remark that foreigners regulate hate speech. Before we 
cite foreign statutes in any discussion of American law, though, we really 
need to know more. We need to know how hate speech regulation, which 
seems so objectionable in the United States, came to seem acceptable 
elsewhere … In neither France nor Germany is it right to view hate-speech 
regulation in isolation from other patterns of behavior, for in both 
  
 46. While James Q. Whitman acknowledges Friedrich Kübler’s argument that 
European hate speech legislation is “largely a product of the second half of the twentieth 
century,” that is, an expression of the “high ideals of tolerance that have grown up since the 
Holocaust,” he traces the origins of French hate speech legislation to the 18th century 
“revolutionary redistribution of honor” that was previously reserved to aristocracy. Supra 
note [Whitman] at 1395-1396, 1398, quoting Friedrich Kübler, How Much Freedom for 
Racist Speech?, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 335 at 336, 366 (1998) (“Specific laws against racist 
hate speech are largely a product of the second half of the twentieth century. In part, their 
origins are shaped by the specific national experience. This is particularly obvious in 
Germany, where its approach is primarily dictated by the trauma of the Holocaust.”)  
 47. The same holds true of other aspects of American constitutional law. For 
example, the Monica Lewinski case was generally misunderstood by the French as being a 
reflection of perceived American puritanism, rather than as a manifestation of the rule of law. 
An insightful French-American comparative analysis of the Nixon and Clinton cases is 
provided by ELISABETH ZOLLER, DE NIXON À CLINTON: MALENTENDUS JURIDIQUES 
TRANSATLANTIQUES (1999). 
 48. Id., citing Thomas Nagel, Concealment and Exposure, 27 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 1, 9 
n.4 (1998) (describing France, in contrast to the “regressed” United States, as a 
“postadolescent civilization.”). 
 49. See supra note [Whitman] at 1395-96, 1398. 
2013] The Blues Brothers 451 
countries the regulation of hate speech is only one aspect of a more 
complex cultural pattern.50  
In the same manner, the explanation of the meaning of the free speech 
clause of the First Amendment to foreign audiences requires an exploration 
of the cultural patterns that support the constitutional protection of hate 
speech in the United States. It further requires, as Bernhard Grossfeld 
suggested,51 translating said culture through images that can be grasped by 
the foreign audience. But as Whitman mentioned, “[w]ithin our swelling 
civility literature there has not been much in the way of careful comparative 
law.”52 The second half of this article, therefore, aims at filling that gap by 
applying comparative methodology—and the consumption of culture as a 
focus—to the understanding by a non-American audience, particularly a 
Western European audience, of the American constitutional protection of 
hate speech, through a case study of the aforementioned scene from The 
Blues Brothers. 
II. THE BLUES BROTHERS AND AMERICAN NAZIS 
The 1980 musical comedy The Blues Brothers,53 John Landis’ fourth 
film as a director and his first international blockbuster, features the 
adventures of Jake and Elwood Blues, two characters as talented at playing 
the blues as they are at running afoul of the law. The Blues Brothers are on 
a mission to raise $5,000 to save the orphanage where they grew up, and 
they set out to fulfill that mission by putting back together their old eponym 
band and playing music. As they do so, they manage to find themselves 
chased by a number of groups, from abandoned ex-girlfriends to country-
music-playing rednecks, to the entire police force of the State of Illinois at 
47’39’’ into the movie, on their way to find the last two band members, 
Jake and Elwood run into a political rally being held on a park bridge by 
Nazis of the local American Socialist White People’s Party. Their 
venomous leader delivers a racist and violence-mongering speech which 
infuriates the onlookers.54 The Nazis are protected from the angry crowd of 
hecklers by a line of police, which creates a traffic jam in which the Blues 
Brothers’ car gets stuck. As a policeman walks by their car, Jake engages 
him, and the following dialog takes place: 
  
  
 50. Whitman, supra note 6, at 1281-82 (emphasis omitted). 
 51. See GROSSFELD, supra note 32, at 32. 
 52. Whitman, supra note 6, at 1281. 
 53. See BLUES BROTHERS, supra note 1.  
 54. See id.  
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Jake:     Hey what’s going on? 
Cop: Ah, those bums won their court case, so they’re marching     
today. 
Jake:      What bums? 
Cop:     The fucking Nazi party. 
Elwood:    Illinois Nazis . . .  
Jake:     I hate Illinois Nazis. 
At this point, Elwood slams the gas pedal, “the bluesmobile charges the 
ranks of the brownshirts and stampedes them off the bridge into the water, 
to the cheers of the crowd. As Jake and Elwood drive off, the soaked Nazi 
commander vows revenge.”55 
The scene is a direct reference to the famous Skokie case that took place 
in the same State of Illinois in 1978, two years prior to the release of the 
movie.56 As has been summarized elsewhere, 
1978 was a year of legal triumph for neo-Nazis in the city of Skokie, 
Illinois. The city had refused to issue a permit for a demonstration the 
National Socialist Party of America intended to conduct in a Jewish 
neighborhood, [heavily populated by holocaust survivors.] At the core of 
the city’s rationale for refusing permission was the harm that such a 
demonstration would cause the Jewish community in general and to local 
Holocaust survivors in particular. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that 
the refusal was unconstitutional as it violated the First Amendment.57 This 
was a remarkable case because it featured the most ignominious of speech 
and the severest of harm. By refusing to hear Skokie’s petition,58 the U.S. 
Supreme Court made it clear that the freedom of speech was a value so 
integral to the [U.S.] democratic way of life as to withstand virtually any 
form of legal balancing.59 
  
 55. Id.  
 56. The script explicitly locates the scene in Skokie, Illinois. John Landis, THE 
BLUES BROTHERS—script 1979 6-Scene 31, (Apr. 25, 1979) (unpublished script containing 
rough outline of plot) (John Landis Papers, circa 1978-1998, 2-f.15, on file with the Margaret 
Herrick Library, Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Science). 
 57. Mailland, supra note 36, at 1183 n.5 (citing Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 916, 916 n. 
6 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (mem.)). 
 58. “In Justice Blackmun’s dissent to the Court’s decision not to grant certiorari, he 
asserts that ‘the present case affords the Court an opportunity to consider whether . . . there is 
no limit whatsoever to the exercise of free speech.’” Mailland, supra note 36, at 1183 n.6 
(quoting Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 916, 919 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (mem.)). 
 59. Mailland, supra note 36, at 1183. For Carl Cohen, then an ACLU Director, “[t]he 
principle that ‘Congress shall make no law’ . . . is perennially tested by American Nazis. . . . 
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Up until 2000 when the highly publicized French Yahoo! case,60 which 
featured neo-Nazi websites hosted on U.S. servers and accessed from 
France, made apparent to the world that hate speech is constitutionally 
protected in the United States, any statement to that effect used to be 
received by most Europeans with not just disgust, but disbelief. The cultural 
clash, however, was revealed in this case. The U.S. company was 
prosecuted in a French court for displaying Nazi items on its auction pages 
and for hosting several xenophobic pages on Geocities, Yahoo’s free 
webpage hosting service, in contravention of anti-hate speech provisions of 
French law. Tim Koogle, Yahoo!’s CEO, was also personally prosecuted for 
being an accessory to the dissemination of Holocaust-denial materials, 
though he was later cleared of that charge by the French courts.61 Tension 
surrounding the distribution of Nazi speech over the Internet was also 
particularly palpable in Germany, where a similar case had recently taken 
place.62 To Western European audiences, and particularly French and 
German audiences, the fact that speech which would likely be considered in 
  
By presenting the extreme case, these Nazis provide an instructive test of a very good 
principle.” Carl Cohen, Skokie—The Extreme Test, THE NATION, Apr. 15, 1978, at 422, 428. 
 60. Mailland, supra note 36, at 1208 n.110 (citing Union des Etudiants Juifs de 
France [UEJF] & Ligue Contre le Racisme et L’Antisémitisme [LICRA] v. Yahoo!, Inc. & 
Yahoo! France, Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] 
Paris, May 22, 2000, (Fr.)), available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/ 
cti/tgiparis20000522.htm#texte, available in English at http://www.lapres.net/yahen.html; 
Mailland, supra note 36, at 1208 n.110 (citing Union des Etudiants Juifs de France [UEJF] & 
Ligue Contre le Racisme et L’Antisémitisme [LICRA] v. Yahoo!, Inc. & Yahoo! France, 
Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, Nov. 20, 
2000, (Fr.)), available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis20001120.pdf, 
available in English at http://www.lapres.net/yahen11.html. 
 61. See generally Mailland, supra note 36 (for a detailed account of the Yahoo! 
case).  
 62. As summarized by John McGuire, in 1995,  
American Internet service provider Compuserve blocked access to 
200 chat groups for fear of prosecution under Bavaria’s obscenity 
laws. Because Compuserve did not have the technology to ban the 
group only to its 220,000 customers in Germany, it had to ban the 
groups worldwide, suspending access to four million subscribers in 
147 countries. The ban occurred after internet-surfing police in 
Munich executed a search warrant on Compuserve’s Munich office . 
. . . [w]hile the prosecutor denied pressuring Compuserve into 
compliance, Compuserve stated it had no choice but to shut down the 
sites . . . Munich prosecutors followed with charges that Compuserve 
general manager Felix Somm was an accessory to the dissemination 
of pornography and extremist propaganda, alleging that customers 
had access to forbidden images and Nazi symbols.  
Mailland, supra note 36, at 1201 & n.84 (quoting John F. McGuire, When Speech is Heard 
Around the World: Internet Content Regulation in the United States and Germany, 74 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 750, 769 (1999)); see also Brandon Mitchener, Ex-Compuserve Official 
Convicted in German Court, WALL ST. J., May 29, 1998, at B7 (describing background and 
trial of head of Compuserve Germany). 
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such jurisdictions as criminally reprehensible speech, and that would cause 
so much harm to innocent victims,63 would be protected under what the 
French tend to refer to with disdain as “that sacrosanct freedom of 
speech,”64 is baffling. France is one of the Western democracies where the 
positive, paternalistic role of the government is most salient. French 
sovereignty rests in the Nation,65 whose will is expressed by Parliament. 
The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen declares that “[t]he 
Law has the right to forbid . . . those actions that are injurious to society.”66 
Further, “The Law protects the people against the arbitrary abuse of power. 
The relationship, therefore, is one of trust placed in Parliament by the 
people. It is a faith that Laws will protect the general populace against the 
abuses of liberties by some. With regard to hate speech, the positive role of 
the French government is manifested in the Law of July 29, 1881 on the 
Freedom of the Press (Law on the Press of 1881), which criminalizes the 
expression of racist ideas.67 The prohibition of hate speech is a consequence 
of the belief that harm will result from such speech and that Parliament has 
a duty to protect the people against such harm.”68 French positive law offers 
many more examples of content control through operation of criminal laws, 
as mentioned in Part I, supra. Such an approach to civil liberties, and, 
generally, to state-society relations, is the product of a long history of 
centralization, which the scope of this paper is too narrow to address.69 
Suffice it to say that centralization and a vertical, top-down mode of 
government have become pillars of the French State through a long period 
of history that encompasses the fall of the Western Roman Empire in 496, 
the barbaric chaos that ensued, and the establishment of the Capetian 
  
 63. The Illinois demonstration was planned in the city of Skokie, at the time heavily 
populated with Holocaust survivors. On the topic of harm as part of First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, see generally RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND 
NAZIS?: HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE NEW FIRST AMENDMENT (New York Univ. 
Press 1997); see also, on Skokie specifically, the excellent docudrama by Herbert Wise: 
SKOKIE (Titus Productions 1981). 
 64. Julien Raynaud, Sacro-sainte liberté d’expression, ANNUAIRE DE DROIT 
EUROPEEN 775 (2008). 
 65. For Eugen Weber, “national unity is perceived as the expression of a general 
will.” WEBER, supra note 35, at 95. 
 66. Mailland, supra note 36, at 1184 & n.11 (quoting DECLARATION UNIVERSELLE 
DES DROITS DE L’HOMME ET DU CITOYEN [Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man and of 
the Citizen], art. 5 (Fr.)), available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/histoire/dudh/1789 
.asp, available in English at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/education/frdeclaration.html.  
 67. Mailland, supra note 36, at 1184-85 & n.12 (citing Loi du 29 Juillet 1881 sur la 
Liberté de la Presse [Law of July 29, 1881 on the Freedom of the Press] art. 24 (Fr.)). 
available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT0000060707 
22&dateTexte=vig, available in English at http://beta.genocidepreventionnow.org/Portals/ 
0/docs/Laws_Banning_Holocaust%20Denial_blog.pdf.  
 68. Mailland, supra note 36, at 1185. 
 69. See generally Weber, supra note 35; see generally JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE 
A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 1-342 
(1998). 
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monarchy in 987, through the reigns of Louis XIV and Napoléon, to the 
Third Republic and the current Fifth Republic, centralization and a vertical, 
top-down mode of government have become pillars of the French State. 
“‘[I]t was centralization,’ said Alexandre Sanguinetti, ‘which permitted the 
making of France despite the French . . . .’”70 Referring to the design of 
French roads, Yale historian James Scott suggested that they were designed 
to “facilitate central control.”71 The “centralizing aesthetic” of the plan 
“severed or weakened lateral cultural and economic ties by favoring 
hierarchical links.”72 State policy resembled such “a ‘hardwiring pattern’”73 
that centralization and top-down government planning and oversight of 
social relations have come in the modern era to be felt as a visceral need by 
the French people. This explains why individuals raised in the French 
cognitive frames have a very difficult time grasping why the constitutional 
protection of hate speech would make sense to Americans. 
Making sense of the American way would require going deep into not 
only legal but also historical, religious, and economic considerations.74 Such 
exploration eventually uncovers two fundamental pillars of First 
Amendment (free speech clause) jurisprudence, which make the American 
way, in that respect, unique. First, First Amendment jurisprudence rests on 
the concept of a “marketplace of ideas.” As its name indicates, this concept 
is a replica of traditional capitalist thought in the field of intellectual 
commodities. Just like the marketplace of traditional commodities is meant 
to find its equilibrium and self-regulate in efficient ways as long as it is free 
from governmental interference, under the concept of marketplace of ideas, 
the best ideas (intellectual commodities) will prevail and rise from the 
marketplace, as long as said marketplace is free from governmental 
interference; that is, as long the government does not pick, on behalf of the 
citizenry, the good ideas from the bad.75 If the government was to interfere, 
the market would be unnaturally distorted, and, as a result, would not be 
able to produce the best ideas. In the field of hate speech, this leads to the 
  
 70. WEBER, supra note 35, at 113 (footnote omitted).  
 71. See SCOTT, supra note 68, at 75.  
 72. Id. at 76. 
 73. Id. at 73.  
 74. See generally LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986) (on the Skokie case in particular, and the 
constitutional protection of hate speech in general); see also DONALD A. DOWNS, NAZIS IN 
SKOKIE: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1985); see also HATE SPEECH 
AND THE CONSTITUTION (Steven J. Heyman ed., 1996); see also ARYEH NEIER, DEFENDING 
MY ENEMY: AMERICAN NAZIS, THE SKOKIE CASE, AND THE RISKS OF FREEDOM (1979). But see 
generally DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 62; Stanley Fish, There’s No Such Things as 
Free Speech and It’s a Good Thing Too, BOS. REV., Feb. 1992, reprinted in HATE SPEECH 
AND THE CONSTITUTION 180 (Steven J. Heyman ed., 1996). 
 75. See generally BOLLINGER, supra note 73; see also DOWNS, supra note 73; see 
also HATE SPEECH AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 73; see also NEIER, supra note 73; but 
see generally DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 62; see also Fish, supra note 73. 
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belief that the best way to defeat hate speech is through allowing said 
speech to be expressed. Aryeh Neier, the former head of the American Civil 
Liberties Union when the ACLU represented Skokie’s Nazis in court, and 
himself a Jew who escaped Germany in 1939, wrote,  
I supported free speech for Nazis when they wanted to march in Skokie in 
order to defeat Nazis. Defending my enemy is the only way to protect a 
free society against the enemies of freedom . . . I could not bring myself to 
advocate freedom of speech in Skokie if I did not believe that the chances 
are best for preventing a repetition of the Holocaust in a society where 
every incursion on freedom is resisted.76 
Second, First Amendment jurisprudence relies on a related concept 
which permeates American state-society relations, that is, the feeling that 
government should generally not interfere with human activity. This pillar 
has its roots in particular in the fact that Puritan founders, including John 
Winthrop, the “brave leader of Christian tribes,”77 were fleeing England in 
order to find religious freedom. As a result, as put by United States Supreme 
Court Justice Jackson,  
[t]he very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority 
from assuming a guardianship of the public mind through regulating the 
press, speech, and religion. In this field every person must be his own 
watchman for truth, because the forefathers did not trust any government 
to separate the true from the false for us.78  
Freedom, in the American model, is freedom from the government, 
rather than as in the French model, freedom guaranteed, implemented, and 
monitored by the government.79 This notion that it is the people that must 
  
 76. NEIER, supra note 73, at 1-3.  
 77. JOHN WINTHROP, A MODELL OF CHRISTIAN CHARITY (1630) 33-48, reprinted in 
COLLECTIONS OF THE MASS. HISTORICAL SOC’Y (1838), available at http://history.hanover. 
edu/texts/winthmod.html.  
 78. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 79. James Whitman proposes a third explanation to the difference in approaches, in 
the field of hate speech, between France and Germany on one hand, and the US on the other:  
This difference is one that I try to capture in a large sociological 
generalization: France and Germany, I argue, have witnessed, each in 
its own way, leveling up. In both societies, the cultural memory of an 
age of social hierarchy is strong, and the commitment to modem 
egalitarianism has been a commitment to the proposition that all 
persons should stand on the highest rung of the social hierarchy. 
Egalitarianism in France and Germany is an egalitarianism that 
proclaims we are all aristocrats now; and in practice this has been an 
egalitarianism of widely generalized norms of civil respect. 
American egalitarianism, by contrast, is, I suggest, an egalitarianism 
of leveling down, which proclaims, in effect, that there are no more 
aristocrats-that we all stand together on the lowest rung of the social 
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separate the true from the false, rather than the government, takes form in 
political science under the heading “popular sovereignty.” In France, 
sovereignty rests in the Nation, whose will is expressed by Parliament, 
which in turns leads to a vertical societal and governmental model where it 
is the State that decides which ideas are best and weeds out the “bad” ideas 
by criminalizing their expression. The State has gone as far as designating 
“official truths,”80 such as the findings of the Nuremberg trials, and more 
generally the existence of the holocaust. The negation of these truths is a 
criminal offense with strict-liability provisions that do not provide for a 
truth defense.81 In other words, as a team of French and American authors 
has remarked, “the French government arrogates itself the power to declare 
‘truth’ and to criminally punish those who disagree with governmentally 
declared truths.”82 By contrast, the U.S. model in this respect is best 
summarized by United States Supreme Court Justice Jackson: “[t]he very 
purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority from 
assuming a guardianship of the public mind through regulating the press, 
speech, and religion. In this field every person must be his own watchman 
for truth, because the forefathers did not trust any government to separate 
the true from the false for us.”83 Unlike in the French model, Americans are 
not concerned by potential abuses of free speech, by “risks” of freedom. 
Rather, as summed up by the late political scientist and First Amendment 
champion Alexander Meiklejohn, “in a society pledged to self-government, 
it is never true that, in the long run, the security of the nation is endangered 
by the people . . . . Freedom is always wise. That is the faith, the 
  
ladder. One consequence is that this egalitarianism of the lowest rung 
has often proven to be an egalitarianism of lack of respect.  
See Whitman, supra note 6, at 1285. And Whitman concluded that  
[i]t is important to us, as political actors in everyday life, to refuse to 
show respect-to refuse to participate in what we perceive, more 
strongly than Europeans do, to be the hypocrisy of manners. In this 
sense we are the heirs of the great disrespecters of Antiquity, the 
Cynics, and some of the early Christians; and of the Quakers, too, 
who played such an important role in the formation of American 
social egalitarianism. And our free speech, to adopt a term from 
ancient cynic philosophy, tends to express itself as “parrhesia” -as 
speech that is not just about the sober expression of opinions, but 
also about the free and aggressive display of disrespect … Part of 
what the comparison with France and Germany can do is underline 
this association between the politics of egalitarianism and the reach 
of the regulation of civility.  
See id. at 1397. 
 80. See Weaver, supra note 3, at 509.  
 81. Id. at 497. 
 82. Id. at 513. 
 83. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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experimental faith, by which we Americans have undertaken to live.”84 In 
other words, to focus on hate speech, the security of the U.S. will not be 
endangered even if hate speech is allowed to be expressed, because the 
people are capable of determining for itself which ideas are good, and which 
are bad. It is the people, not the government, who will naturally reject the 
bad ideas as they emerge in the marketplace. To paraphrase Aryeh Neier, 
Americans must let the Nazis speak in order to defeat the Nazis.85 
Armed with such an understanding, the work of the non-American 
comparatist is only half done. As stated earlier, “comparative law . . . 
requires an exchange of images. We must allow the concepts of the foreign 
law to become images and then describe them in our language.”86 I propose 
to use the aforementioned scene from the movie The Blues Brothers as the 
popular culture image through which to decrypt the meaning, and uncover 
the underlying cultural principles, of the First Amendment for a non-
American audience. Such enterprise has been attempted once before, yet 
only in a footnote.87 In this footnote to a 2002 paper published in the 
University of Miami International and Comparative Law Review, Joshua 
Spector remarks “that the only significant popular legacy of the Skokie 
Cases is found in mainstream cinema. To wit: in THE BLUES BROTHERS 
the two protagonists find their vehicle halted in order to allow a group of 
neo-Nazis to exercise their court-won right to march.”88 Spector’s analysis 
of the scene is as follows: “[t]he protagonists may indeed interpret the 
march as ‘fighting words’ for they react by placing their vehicle in low gear 
and running the demonstrators off a bridge and into water, much to the 
delight of on-lookers and the duty-bound police.”89 I disagree with this 
interpretation. In the United States, “fighting words” are not considered 
protected speech,90 and suppression of and retaliation against such 
utterances lawfully come from the police, and subsequently the courts, not 
the people.91 The fact that the police are protecting the speakers in the scene 
indicates that the speech is not fighting words, but instead political speech. 
  
 84. Testimony on the Meaning of the First Amendment: Hearing Before the Hennings 
S. Subcomm, 84th Cong. (1955) (statement of Alexander Meiklejohn), in ALEXANDER 
MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 112 (3d ed. 
Greenwood Press 1979). 
 85. See NEIER, supra note 73.  
 86. See CURRAN, COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 19, at 32. 
 87. Joshua Spector, Note, Spreading angst or promoting free expression? Regulating 
hate speech on the Internet, 10 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 155, n.42 (2002). 
 88. Id.  
 89. Id.  
 90. In the words of Supreme Court Justice Murphy, “[t]here are certain well-defined 
and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never 
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and the obscene, 
the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words.” Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72, (1942) (emphasis added). 
 91. Id.  
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This speech must be protected by the police even if it leads to a crowd of 
hecklers breaching the peace, like in the Terminiello v. Chicago, decided by 
the Supreme Court in 1949.92 In this case,  
[a] passionate message of racial hatred was delivered—also in Chicago, in 
1949, by a Catholic priest under suspension—to a sizable audience in a 
large hall. Outside, a cordon of police struggled to control the infuriated 
counter-demonstrators, while Father Terminiello completed his speech. He 
was later convicted for creating a breach of the peace—a breach created 
not by him or his followers but by persons outside the lecture hall so 
maddened by his bigotry as to throw bottles and bricks at the windows as 
he spoke.93 
The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that 
“breach of the peace” included speech that “stirs the public to anger, invites 
dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance.” In fact, 
Justice Douglas stated in Terminiello’s famous majority opinion, 
[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite 
dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a 
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or 
even stirs people to anger. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions 
and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an 
idea. This is why freedom of speech, though not absolute . . . is 
nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown 
likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil 
that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.94  
I therefore propose the following interpretation of the scene. The Blues 
Brothers represent the American people. The bridge upon which the Nazis 
are standing represents the marketplace of ideas. The police are bound to let 
the ideas be expressed, as an application of the principles of the marketplace 
of ideas and of popular sovereignty. The cop might well hate the fucking 
Nazi [bums],95 but because “the forefathers did not trust any government to 
separate the true from the false for us,”96 he is precluded from suppressing 
the idea and instead must protect the speaker from the hecklers. Instead, it is 
the people who suppress the bad ideas in the marketplace. Because the 
Nazis are allowed to speak, they are in a position to get their ideas 
confronted by other ideas in the marketplace, something that would not be 
  
 92. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1949). For Carl Cohen, “the application 
of the ‘fighting words’ doctrine would have to be so narrowly restricted to special 
circumstances as to have no bearing on a proposed demonstration by Nazis.“ See Cohen, 
supra note 58, at 131. 
 93. See Cohen, supra note 58, at 129.  
 94. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).  
 95. See Landis, Long Synopsis, supra note 1.  
 96. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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possible were the Nazis forced to meet and propagate their ideas in the 
shadows, as is the case in most of Europe. In this scene, the Blues Brothers 
running over the Nazis and forcing them off the bridge represents the 
operation of the marketplace of ideas and the will of the sovereign people. 
The Nazis are defeated, not by the government, but by the people. 
CONCLUSION 
The Blues Brothers’ scene is apt at clarifying intricacies of the free 
speech clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution for 
a foreign audience. It is also apt at supporting comparisons between various 
models of relationship between a people and its government. In this case, 
between a state-society relations model that relies on popular sovereignty—
in turn expressed in the constitutional protection of hate speech—on the one 
hand, and more vertical models in countries such as France—where hate 
speech is prohibited because the people leave it to the state to separate the 
right from the wrong on their behalf, and generally rely on the state for 
protection. I therefore propose that this scene be used in teaching the free 
speech clause of the American First Amendment to non-American 
audiences, particularly Western European ones, and more generally in 
discussing the American system of government and state-society relations 
with non-Americans. From a methodological standpoint, this case study also 
exemplifies the value of consuming culture in the process of understanding 
manifestations of complex foreign cultural and cognitive systems, and helps 
foster mutual understanding between peoples. 
 
